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TOWARDS A THEORY OF LEGITIMATE ACCESS:
MORALLY LEGITIMATE AUTHORITY AND THE RIGHT
OF CITIZENS TO ACCESS THE CIVIL JUSTICE SYSTEM
Kenneth Einar Himma*
It is undeniable that the new information technologies of the last few
decades have been put to many public uses that increase citizen access to
the civil justice system. Nearly every state, for example, has published
its statutory codes on official websites that can easily be found through
legal portals,1 making the content of such codes readily accessible to
citizens from the convenience of their homes. Similarly, many state
agencies publish online legal forms that were formerly available only at
certain physical locations, such as a courthouse or municipal building.
Incorporating these technologies into the legal system has made it much
easier for many citizens to access the civil justice system.
Nevertheless, such technologies, if improperly used, can instead
diminish the access of many citizens to the civil justice system. One
obvious concern is that many citizens lack effective access to the new
information technologies because they either cannot afford such access
or lack the necessary education to take advantage of them. Devoting
limited public resources to publishing public documents exclusively on
the web, for example, can effectively exclude such p~rsons from access
to those documents. Another concern is that some persons with access to
the new technologies may not be able to take full advantage of them.
Information published using streaming video technology, for example, is
not available to many disabled persons who rely on text readers unable
to read video.
Given that these technologies can be used in ways that potentially
harm citizens by decreasing their access to the civil justice system, it is
reasonable to think that there are general moral principles that govern the
. I am extremely indebted to Adrienne Cobb and R. Lee Sims for their generous help with some
of the research and to Marsha Iverson, Public Relations Specialist for the King County Library
System.
1. See, e.g., FindLaw, State Resources, at http://www.findlaw.com/1 1stategov (last visited Jan.
28, 2004).
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state's use of such technologies. 2 At the most abstract level, these
principles constrain state behavior by defining a general right on the part
of citizens to access the civil justice system. The permissibility of
incorporating any given technology into the civil justice system would
be at least partly determined by whether it violates the general right of
access that is defined by these principles.3
This Article considers the issue of what the state is morally obligated
to provide by way of citizen access to the civil justice system. It begins
by describing the general problem of morally legitimate authority and
how it bears on the problem of access to the civil justice system. It then
identifies three different approaches to the general problem of morally
legitimate authority and argues that none of these approaches warrants
thinking that the state is morally obligated to provide each citizen with
perfectly equal access to the civil justice system. The argument
concludes that the three approaches to legitimacy converge on two
principles: one that defines an affirmative obligation (the Reasonable
Access Principle) to provide to each citizen what is minimally necessary
to develop and defend a plausible legal position, and one that defines a
negative obligation (the Equality Principle) to refrain from restricting
access to the civil justice system for reasons that deny the equality of
every moral person.4
Three observations about the character and scope of the argument and
thesis would be helpful. First, the thesis is not that the two principles
identified exhaust the scope of the state's obligations regarding citizen
access to the civil justice system; it is rather that these two principles
define necessary conditions for moral legitimacy in this regard. Second,
as the title suggests, the argument purports to be no more than a step
"towards" a theory of legitimate access and is hence somewhat
schematic in character; a fully adequate defense of the Reasonable
2. Presumably, any act that can potentially harm innocent persons is subject to the requirements
of morality-though these requirements may differ according to whether the agent is an individual
or a state. See infra Part I for more discussion on this point.
3. Since there may be other relevant moral principles, the claim that a particular use does not
violate the general right of access does not imply that it is morally permissible; the use may violate
other principles.
4. This approach has an advantage for skeptics of reductive approaches to theorizing about
legitimacy. If one believes, as I do, that there is a plurality of basic principles that jointly define the
conditions of legitimacy (rather than just one principle), then an analysis showing that three
plausible candidates for inclusion in a non-reductive theory of legitimacy converge on two
principles goes a long way towards making the case that any plausible non-reductive theory of
legitimacy will include these two principles.
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Access and Equality Principles would require more space than is
available here. Third, the Article does not discuss the new information
technologies except where helpful to illustrate a particular issue. While
the various ways in which the new technologies can be misused
highlight the need for a general theory of legitimate access, the
principles defining the foundation for such a theory can be developed
without discussing these misuses. Indeed, as a logical matter, the uses to
which a state might put these technologies present application-contexts
for the two principles of legitimate access; such principles apply to these
examples and are not justified by these examples.
I. THE PROBLEMS OF ACCESS AND MORALLY LEGITIMATE
AUTHORITY
A. The Centrality ofAccess to the Justice System in the Protection of
Legal Rights
Legal systems regulate behavior through the promulgation of legal
rules and principles. These legal rules and principles typically purport to
establish duties that require subjects to behave or refrain from behaving
in certain ways. Sometimes these duties are unconditional (though not
necessarily absolute), as in the case of the criminal rule that prohibits
assault and in the case of the tort rule that requires us to protect other
persons from reasonably foreseeable injuries that might proximately
result from our behavior. Sometimes these duties are conditional, as in
the case of the general contract rule that requires us to honor the terms of
agreements into which we freely enter.
In many instances, these legal duties purport to give rise to legal
rights. X's legal duty to refrain from assaulting Y is fairly characterized
as defining a legal right on the part of Y against X that X not assault y.
6
5. The issue of whether legal systems have some unique defining function is controversial among
legal philosophers. Lon L. Fuller believed that a definition of law must include the idea that the law's
essential function is to "achiev[e] ... [social] order... through subjecting people's conduct to the
guidance of general rules by which they may themselves orient their behavior." Lon L. Fuller, A Reply to
Professors Cohen and Dworkin, 10 VILL. L. REV. 655, 657 (1965). Other philosophers deny that law
has any unique conceptual function, arguing that legal systems can be deployed to achieve a variety of
purposes. See, e.g., Stephen Perry, The Varieties of Legal Positivism, 9 CAN. J.L. & JURISPRUDENCE 361
(1994).
6. Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld argued that, as a conceptual matter, claim-rights correlate with
duties or obligations in the following way: "if X has a right against Y that he shall stay off the
former's land, the correlative (and equivalent) is that Y is under a duty toward X to stay off the
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Likewise, X's legal duty to take reasonable measures to protect Y from
reasonably foreseeable injuries that might proximately result from X's
behavior is fairly characterized as defining a legal right on the part of Y
against X that X not negligently injure Y. Indeed, the recognition,
creation, or establishment of legal rights, if not conceptually essential to
the existence of a legal system, is utterly central to legal practice in legal
systems that resemble ours in theoretically salient respects.
However, the recognition, creation, or establishment of a legal right
by statutory or judicial promulgation has little prudential value to the
putative holders if the legal system does not provide some mechanism
for addressing violations of those rights. 7 To protect a legal right in a
prudentially meaningful way, the law must do two things.8 First, and
most obviously, it must attach some legal consequence to the violation
of a right: the law must stipulate either that the violating party is subject
to some requirement that self-interested rational agents are likely to
regard as undesirable or that the aggrieved party is eligible for some
form of relief that self-interested rational agents are likely to regard as
desirable. Second, it must provide some mechanism by which the person
whose right is violated may activate those consequences against the
person who violates that right.
Though legal theorists tend to focus on the first of these features, it is
clear that both are needed to endow a legal right with even minimal
prudential value. In worlds like ours, where the interests of rational self-
interested agents frequently conflict, a right that can always be violated
without any legal consequences whatsoever has no prudential value
whatsoever to the holder of the right. But this is no less true of a right
that fails to provide some mechanism by which the right-holder can
place." WESLEY NEWCOMB HOHFELD, FUNDAMENTAL LEGAL CONCEPTIONS 38 (1919). It is a
conceptual truth, then, that part of what constitutes X as having a right against Y that Y perform (or
refrain from performing) a is that Y has an obligation or duty to perform (or refrain from
performing) a and that duty is owed to Xrather than someone else. While it is fair to say that there is
probably more to the claim that X has a right against Y than just that Y has an appropriate obligation
that is owed to X, it is uncontroversial that Y's having a duty to X is at least part of what it means to
say that Xhas a right against Y.
7. By "prudential value," I mean value from just the standpoint of a rational agent's self-interests.
Se/finterests should not be confused with selfish interests. Brushing my teeth conduces to my self-
interests without necessarily conducing to any selfish interests I might have. The notion of
selfishness is a morally normative term that connotes disapprobation.
8. I have in mind here only conceptually possible worlds that contain beings who instantiate the
same psychological features that human beings instantiate. It is possible that a legal system might
have prudential value without these features in a world of angels who regard the interests of others
as highly as they regard their own interests. But this is not the world in which we live.
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activate those consequences. No matter how undesirable the legal
consequences of violating a right might be to the offending party, those
consequences cannot engage the offending party's prudential interests
unless there is some mechanism for activating them. Similarly, no matter
how desirable those legal consequences might be to the aggrieved party,
those consequences cannot engage the aggrieved party's prudential
interests unless there is some mechanism for activating them.
The problem of access, then, is utterly central to the practices of any
legal system that purports to establish rights with prudential value to
rational self-interested agents-no less so than the problem of assigning
consequences to violations. Accordingly, the question of what sort of
mechanisms a legal system ought (as a matter of utility, fairness, or
justice) to provide for aggrieved parties to activate these consequences is
no less central to normative legal theory and political morality than the
question of what sorts of consequences ought (as a matter of utility,
fairness, or justice) to be attached to the violation of various rights.
B. The Problem of Morally Legitimate Authority
The problem of justifying state authority arises because the state
enacts laws that purport to dictate the behavior of those who reside
within the physical boundary of the state. As Joseph Raz aptly puts the
matter:
A government does not merely say to its subjects: "Here are our
laws. Give them some weight in your considerations. But of
course you may well be justified in deciding that on balance they
should be disobeyed." It says: "We are better able to decide how
you should act. Our decision is in these laws. You are bound by
them and should follow them whether or not you agree with
them."9
There are two features of moral concern here. The first is that the state
purports to preempt the citizens' own judgments about what they ought
to do by issuing directives the citizens are required to obey regardless of
whether they want to do so.10 The second is that the legal directives of
the state are backed with coercive measures that are impermissible in
any other context: it is hard to think of any other context in which one
person or set of persons can legitimately incarcerate or execute another
9. Joseph Raz, Government by Consent, in AUTHORITY REVISITED 81 (J. Roland Pennock & John
W. Chapman eds., 1987).
10. See, e.g., JOSEPH RAz, ETHICS IN THE PUBLIC DOMAIN (1994) (especially ch. 10).
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person. The need to justify state authority arises, then, because the state
issues preemptive directives that are enforced with measures that are
commonly regarded as presumptively wrong.
While the problem of state authority is especially acute in the criminal
context where the violationof a legal rule is frequently linked to lengthy
periods of incarceration, the state's authority in civil contexts also stands
in need of moral justification. If the availability of coercive mechanisms
is most conspicuous in the criminal context, such mechanisms also play
a central role in civil litigation: other things being equal, the point of
bringing a civil lawsuit for a plaintiff is to secure a coercive order from
the court that requires the defendant to do something. In tort law, the
plaintiff seeks a coercive order of money damages. In contract law, the
plaintiff seeks a coercive order for either money damages or specific
performance. It is fair to say, however, that any plaintiff who brings a
civil suit in any legal system that even remotely resembles this one is
asking the court not only for a judgment, but also-and equally
importantly-for a court order enforcing that judgment.
Indeed, behind every judicial order lies the power to impose sanctions
for contempt of court.11 Contempt sanctions can be civil or criminal in
nature. 12 What distinguishes civil and criminal contempt is not the
conduct giving rise to the sanction; both cases involve conduct that, in
some way, obstructs the administration of justice pursuant to law. What
distinguishes civil and criminal contempt is the purpose for which the
sanction is imposed. Civil contempt is imposed to induce a party to
comply with a particular order of the court and is hence primarily
remedial in nature. 3 Criminal contempt is imposed to punish a party for
behavior, and not to induce compliance with court orders; though a
punitive measure may have the secondary effect of inducing a
recalcitrant subject to comply with the order, its primary purpose
remains punitive. 14
In either case, though, the tools available to the court are the same.
Civil and criminal contempt sanctions may include incarceration15 as
well as fines, 16 and may include even the power to coerce enforcement
11. See WASH. REV. CODE § 2.28.010 (2002).
12. See id. §§ 7.21.030-.040.
13. See id. § 7.21.030.
14. Seeid. § 7.21.040.
15. See id. § 7.21.030(2)(a).
16. See id. § 7.21.040.
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from other relevant persons, such as the attomeys for the relevant
parties.' 7 It is this power that enables judges to enforce their orders even
in civil cases where they cannot plausibly be characterized as imposing
direct or indirect sanctions. Without the contempt sanction, judges would
have, at the very most, indirect means for enforcing orders requiring
payment of civil damages, specific performance, or civil injunctions.
Insofar as state coercion is thus central to enforcing the criminal and
civil law, its role must be justified in both of those contexts. The state's
authority to incarcerate a defendant in a civil suit for failing to obey a
court order is no less problematic from the standpoint of political
morality than its authority to incarcerate a criminal defendant for
violating a criminal statute. The application of coercive force to people
in any context requires some sort of theoretical account that shows it is
justified; to the extent that people have a presumptive moral claim to
autonomously direct their own behavior, the state's exercise of coercive
authority over the individual comes into direct conflict with such a moral
claim and hence requires moral justification.
C. Theories of Legitimacy and Access to Justice
There are a variety of theories that attempt to specify the conditions
under which the state may legitimately enforce its laws. Some of these
theories are both comprehensive and reductive in the sense that they
attempt to justify all the coercive practices of the state by reference to
one or two general moral principles. Contractarian theories, for example,
argue that the state's general authority to coercively dictate behavior is
morally justified because citizens either have consented to such
authority' 8 or would consent to it under ideal conditions.' 9 Since, on this
line of analysis, autonomous moral agents can create binding obligations
for themselves by means of consensual agreements (ideal or actual),
such agreements are morally sufficient to justify the state's use of
coercive mechanisms, in effect, to enforce laws that are posited pursuant
to the terms of the agreement.
Other theories focus on particular areas of law, attempting to show
that the use of coercive mechanisms to enforce those areas can be
morally justified. For example, John Stuart Mill's influential claim that
17. See id. § 7.21.030(2)(c)-(d).
18. See, e.g., JOHN LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT ch. 8, § 95 (Thomas P. Peardon
ed., Bobbs-Merrill Co. 1952) (1690).
19. See, e.g., JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 10 (2d ed. 1999).
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the state can justifiably prohibit only those acts that are "harmful to
others" specifies the limits of the state's legitimate lawmaking authority
to criminalize behavior.20 Normative theories of punishment supplement
such accounts by showing that the state's authority to criminalize
behavior is legitimately backed by the power to incarcerate and possibly
execute those persons who engage in proscribed behavior.2'
Theories that justify the state's authority in areas of civil law tend to
be more specific, focusing on the content of a particular substantive area
of law, rather than on a general capacity of the state to enact civil
regulations of behavior. For example, Charles Fried justifies the content
of the contract law by showing it coheres, for the most part, to
uncontroversial moral principles governing promises.22 Jules Coleman
justifies the content of tort law by showing that it embodies a legitimate
conception of corrective justice. Robert Nozick argues that property
law is justified to the extent that it coheres with moral principles that
define a natural right to property, which includes the authority to freely
alienate one's interest in property by a variety of morally effective
consensual mechanisms.2 4
While there are a number of theories attempting to describe the
conditions of procedural legitimacy, they have largely focused on the
criminal context. For example, these theories focus on the procedural
rights that a criminal defendant should have, which include (but are not
limited to) a right to a fair trial, a right to competent representation, a
right to appeal, and a right to be acquitted if the evidence does not meet
the "beyond a reasonable doubt" standard.25 Normative theories of
criminal procedure attempt to describe the principles that determine
whether a trial is "fair," representation is "competent," and so on.
The general issue of what kind of access to the civil justice system a
state must provide in order to be legitimate has received comparatively
little attention from normative legal and political theorists. While legal
20. JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 10 (Gertrude Himmelfarb ed., Penguin Books 1974) (1859).
21. For a helpful summary of the various normative theories of punishment, see Toni M. Massaro,
Shame, Culture, andAmerican Criminal Law, 89 MICH. L. REV. 1880 (1991).
22. CHARLES FRIED, CONTRACT AS PROMISE: A THEORY OF CONTRACTUAL OBLIGATION 2-27
(1981).
23. JULES L. COLEMAN, THE PRACTICE OF PRINCIPLE: IN DEFENSE OF A PRAGMATIST APPROACH
TO LEGAL THEORY 13-53 (2001).
24. ROBERT NozICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA 150-53 (1974).
25. See, e.g., Anthony A. Morano, A Reexamination of the Development of the Reasonable Doubt
Rule, 55 B.U. L. REV. 507, 513-15 (1975); Charles R. Nesson, Reasonable Doubt and Permissive
Inferences: The Value of Complexity, 92 HARV. L. REV. 1187, 1192-99 (1979).
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theorists have devoted considerable space to critically evaluating the
requirements of various rules and principles of civil procedure,26 the
focus of such efforts is different from the general normative issue of how
much access to civil justice is minimally needed for state legitimacy. In
the typical case, the issue is whether a particular rule or interpretation of
the rule is consistent with the constitutional requirements of due
process-which, for all practical purposes, simply assumes that the
United States Constitution defines the morally appropriate standards of
access. For this reason, one can criticize the rules of civil procedure as
being too lenient or too restrictive without developing a general
theoretical account of how much access is minimally consistent with the
legitimacy of a legal system. The assumption that the Constitution
defines legitimate standards of access to civil justice provides an implicit
standard for evaluating the rules of civil procedure that ostensibly
circumvents the need for a general theory of legitimate access.
If academic lawyers have paid little attention to such issues, legal and
political philosophers have paid even less. A search of the Philosopher's
Index, which is the most comprehensive database of abstracts for
philosophical books and articles, for the phrase "access to justice" failed
to turn up even one abstract; in contrast, the phrase "distributive justice"
turned up 435 abstracts.27 While searches for the terms "civil liability"
and "due process" yielded thirty abstracts,2 8 none had anything to do
with the issue of general access to the justice system in civil cases. In
addition, not one of sixteen leading anthologies for courses in
philosophy of law and political philosophy29 featured even one article on
26. It is important to note that such issues include many that are implicated by the more general
issue. For example, a number of articles have been written on the subject of whether courts should
waive filing fees and other financial impediments in cases of indigent plaintiffs. See, e.g., John
MacArthur Maguire, Poverty and Civil Litigation, 36 HARV. L. REV. 361 (1923); Harry P. Stumpf,
Law and Poverty: A Political Perspective, 3 WIS. L. REv. 694 (1968). Such discussions typically
assume, without argument, more general principles of legitimacy that are applied to the specific
facts. In contrast, my concern here is to argue for these general principles of legitimacy by
grounding them in three general approaches to theorizing about moral legitimacy.
27. Search conducted on August 18, 2003. The Philosopher's Index is available commercially
online at http://www.dialog.com.
28. Search conducted on August 18, 2003.
29. APPLIED SOCIAL AND POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY (Elizabeth Smith & H. Gene Blocker eds.,
1994); JURISPRUDENCE CLASSICAL AND CONTEMPORARY: FROM NATURAL LAW TO
POSTMODERNISM (Robert L. Hayman, Jr., et al. eds., 2d ed. 2002); JURISPRUDENCE: TEXT AND
READINGS ON THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW (George Christie & Patrick Martin eds., 2d ed. 1995);
JUSTICE AND ECONOMIC DISTRIBUTION (John Arthur & William Shaw eds., 2d ed. 1991); LAW AND
MORALITY: READINGS IN LEGAL PHILOSOPHY (David Dyzenhaus & Arthur Ripstein eds., 1996);
LLOYD'S INTRODUCTION TO JURISPRUDENCE (M.D.A. Freeman ed., 7th ed. 2001); THE NATURE
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the subject. Although such observations are anecdotal in character, they
seem pretty clearly to show that the general problem of access has gotten
comparatively little attention from philosophers.30
Given the centrality of access to the legitimate operation of
institutions that purport to establish and recognize rights, this is a truly
remarkable omission. Since, as I argued above, the establishment and
recognition of legal rights can have no prudential value whatsoever to
citizens in the absence of a mechanism that enables them to activate
certain kinds of legal consequences when those rights have been
violated,31 adequate access to the justice system is essential to ensure
that legal rights have prudential value to citizen rights-holders. If it is
true, as classically liberal theories of legitimacy typically assume, that
the normative point of state authority is to serve the interests of citizens
by establishing and recognizing rights,32 then adequate access to the civil
justice system is a necessary condition for moral legitimacy. The
problem of access is no less central to theories of legitimacy than the
AND PROCESS OF LAW (Patricia Smith ed., 1993); PHILOSOPHY OF LAW (Joel Feinberg & Jules
Coleman eds., 7th ed. 2004); PHILOSOPHY OF LAW (Conrad Johnson ed., 1993); THE PHILOSOPHY
OF LAW (Frederick Schauer & Walter Sinnott-Armstrong eds., 1996); PHILOSOPHY OF LAW AND
LEGAL THEORY (Dennis Patterson ed., 2003); POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY: ESSENTIAL SELECTIONS
(Aeon J. Skoble & Tibor R. Machan eds., 1999); READINGS IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW (John
Arthur & William H. Shaw eds., 3d ed. 2001); READINGS IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW (Keith
Culver ed., 1999); SOCIAL AND POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY (George Sher & Baruch A. Brody eds.,
1999); SOCIAL IDEALS AND POLICIES: READINGS IN SOCIAL AND POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY (Steven
Luper ed., 1999).
30. Even the most eminent political philosophers seem to overlook the problem of legitimate
access. For example, John Rawls's principles of justice are intended to guide the "basic structure of
society," which he describes as follows:
[T]he basic structure of society is the way in which the main political and social institutions of
society fit together into one system of social cooperation, and the way they assign basic rights
and duties and regulate the division of advantages that arises from social cooperation over time.
The political constitution with an independent judiciary, the legally recognized forms of
property, and the structure of the economy (for example, as a system of competitive markets
with private property in the means of production), as well as the family in some form, all
belong to the basic structure. The basic structure is the background social framework within
which the activities of associations and individuals take place. A just basic structure secures
what we may call background justice.
JOHN RAWLS, JUSTICE AS FAIRNESS: A RESTATEMENT 10 (2001). The omission of any mention of
the importance of access to the justice system to the basic structure of society by arguably the most
eminent political philosopher in the last one hundred years speaks volumes about the lack of
attention philosophers have paid to the issue.
31. See supra Part I.A.
32. For the leading discussion of this conception of authority, see, for example, RAZ, supra note
10, ch. 10. The remainder of this Article will assume that the moral point of a state is to serve its
subjects.
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problem of identifying the substantive constraints on legitimate
lawmaking activities.
For this reason, a comprehensive understanding of moral legitimacy
requires an understanding of the conditions of morally legitimate access.
Since no state can be fully legitimate without guaranteeing adequate
access to the civil justice system, it follows that a fully comprehensive
theory of legitimacy must specify the conditions that are minimally
necessary for morally legitimate access to the civil justice system. No
general theory of legitimacy, then, can succeed without including a
theory of morally legitimate access. The absence of a general theory of
morally legitimate access leaves a profound gap in our understanding of
legitimate state authority.33
Moreover, the foregoing considerations suggest an important
adequacy constraint on general theories of legitimate access. If the moral
point of the state is to serve the prudential interests of its subjects by
establishing and protecting rights, then the state must ensure that its
practice with respect to rights is sufficient to endow those rights with
prudential value to the rights-holders. Since a legal right cannot have any
prudential value unless it provides a mechanism that enables rights-
holders to activate consequences that conduce to their prudential
interests, it follows that a state must provide minimal access to such
mechanisms to assure that its legal rights are prudentially valuable. This
requirement, then, defines an important adequacy constraint on general
theories of morally legitimate access: no theory of legitimate access can
be adequate from the standpoint of classical liberalism without assuring
sufficient access to the civil justice system to guarantee the prudential
value of legal rights to all rationally self-interested citizens.
II. THE STRONG PRINCIPLE OF EQUAL ACCESS
It is tempting to think that the question of how much access to the
justice system a legal system is obligated to provide in civil matters, as a
matter of political morality, has a straightforward answer: perfectly equal
access. On this view, the principle that all citizens have utterly equal
moral worth, a principle presumably assumed by every plausible theory
33. A gap that subsequent parts of this Article attempt to close.
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of legitimacy, implies that every citizen should have utterly equal access
to the justice system in civil disputes.34
While it is difficult to state the principle without vagueness, what this
Article calls the Strong Principle of Equal Access (SPEA) can be
expressed somewhat more rigorously as follows. According to SPEA,
the legal system should take affirmative measures to ensure that every
two citizens have exactly the same level of access to whatever official
resources are available for the judicial redress of grievances in the civil
context. If one citizen X has greater access to some resource or
mechanism m of the civil justice system than another Y, then an injustice
has occurred that the state must remedy by providing whatever is needed
to ensure that Y has the same access to m. 35 Otherwise put, the state must
take affirmative steps to ensure that no one person's access to the civil
justice system is more difficult or burdensome than any other person's
access.
This Part of the Article argues that satisfaction of SPEA is not a
necessary condition for moral legitimacy. To this end, it considers three
different theories of legitimacy that might be adduced in support of
SPEA and argues that none provides a foundation for this principle.
While perfectly equal access might ultimately be ideal in a utopian world
where material resources are unlimited, such access is not required in
this world where the quantity of resources that can be deployed by the
state in any one area is limited by material conditions of scarcity.
A. The General Principle of Equality
The principle that affirms our moral equality as human beings is
grounded in our status as moral persons.36 Each of us has certain
properties, capacities, and potentialities that confer the inviolable moral
status of personhood. This status comes with a full-blown array of
34. The idea that citizens have utterly equal worth should not be construed as inconsistent with
the claim that some moral agents have morally good character and deserve praise for their actions
and some have morally bad character and deserve blame, censure, or punishment.
35. Strictly speaking, the inequality can be remedied by diminishing the access of X, rather than
increasing the access of Y. But, from the standpoint of morally legitimate access, this guts SPEA of
any assurance of even minimal access to the justice system. On this purely formal construction of
the principle, a state of affairs in which no one has any access to any mechanisms that would
facilitate the resolution of civil disputes would be consistent with SPEA. It is clear that, if it is to
define meaningful constraints on what a legitimate state may do at all, SPEA must assume that
someone has minimal access to such mechanisms. What follows assumes such a construction.
36. Again, this should not be construed in a manner inconsistent with our ordinary judgments of
character. See supra note 34.
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general moral rights typically thought to include rights to life, liberty,
and property; indeed, as Mary Anne Warren defines the notion, to be a
moral person is simply to be a full-fledged member of the moral
community.37 To the extent that each person has a full set of moral
rights, it follows that every human being is entitled to equal respect. The
general principle of equality is ultimately a consequence of more
theoretical claims governing humanity and personhood.
There is little dispute that states, as well as individuals, are
constrained by the moral principle of equality. As a matter of political
morality, states have no more liberty than any citizen to violate (as
opposed to infringe) a person's right to life.38 Of course, it may be true
that states can permissibly kill persons in circumstances where
individuals cannot; if, for example, capital punishment is morally
legitimate, it seems clear that only the state can permissibly execute
someone. But, assuming the permissibility of capital punishment, this is
not because a person's right to life does not give rise to obligations on
the part of the state; the state is no less obligated to respect the life of an
innocent person than is any individual. It is rather that a person may be
executed, as a general moral matter, only under circumstances that can
be ensured by the state (or something approximating a state); a suitably
reliable finding of guilt in circumstances that afford defendants a fair
chance to defend themselves is, presumably, a necessary prerequisite to
the legitimate administration of the death penalty.
It is tempting to think that SPEA can be straightforwardly deduced
from the principle of equality. If every person has a full and equal set of
rights that bind both the state and individuals, then the state must provide
every person with a full and equal right to access the justice system in
the civil context. But this implies that the state is morally obligated to
ensure that every two citizens have exactly the same access to the civil
justice system. On this line of reasoning, then, SPEA is simply a
corollary of the principle of equality.
37. Mary Anne Warren, On the Moral and Legal Status of Abortion, MONIST, Jan. 1973, at 43,
53.
38. By definition, to say that a right has been "infringed" is to say only that someone has acted in
a way that is inconsistent with the holder's interest in that right; strictly speaking, then, the claim
that a right has been infringed is a purely descriptive claim that connotes no moral judgment as to
whether or not the infringement is wrong. In contrast, to say that a right has been "violated" is to say
that the right has been infringed by some act and that the relevant act is morally wrong.
Accordingly, it is a conceptual truth that it can be permissible for an individual or entity to infringe a
right, but not to violate a right.
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As it turns out, however, this very natural inference is problematic.
The claim that every person has a full set of equal moral rights does not
imply that the state must, as a moral matter, ensure perfect equality in
every morally relevant respect. Every known state, for example, allows
considerable inequality in the distribution of material resources among
its citizens. While some political theorists believe that such inequalities
are justified to the extent that they conduce to overall utility, 39 others
believe that such inequalities are justified only to the extent that they
conduce to everyone's advantage. 40 But every classically liberal political
theorist believes that a substantial number of these inequalities can, as a
matter of political morality, legitimately be permitted by the state.4'
Here it is crucial to note that inequalities in wealth are not inert with
respect to the exercise of the very rights to which personhood gives rise.
Persons with more wealth will, for example, be better able to exercise
their expressive rights in politically sensitive contexts than persons with
less wealth. Indeed, it is not only easier for wealthy persons in
democratic societies to win a position in government; it is easier for
them to run in the first place. Running for an elected office may require
the payment of a substantial filing fee and other expenses that make it
comparatively more difficult for less affluent persons. While it is
reasonable to think that there are moral limits on how much inequality in
this regard may permissibly be allowed by the state, it is also reasonable
to think that some such inequality is permissible if it is permissible for
the state to allow theoretically significant inequality in the distribution of
resources.
The same is true for access to the civil justice system. Strictly
speaking, a strong principle of equal access, like SPEA, requires the state
to take affirmative steps to ensure that it is no more difficult for one
person to access the justice system in a civil context than it is for any
other person. But if, as a logical matter, the state can allow substantial
inequality in the distribution of resources needed to exercise the right to
free speech consistently with the principle of equality, it follows that, as
a logical matter, the state can allow some inequality of access to the civil
justice system consistently with the principle of equality. If, for example,
it is legitimate to require filing fees as a prerequisite for filing a civil
39. See, e.g., RICHARD B. BRANDT, MORALITY, UTILITARIANISM, AND RIGHTS 380 (1992).
40. See, e.g., RAWLS, supra note 19.
41. Indeed, as a matter of definition, a theory is "classically liberal" only insofar as it purports to
legitimate the basic structure of a constitutional democracy that protects private property and other
basic rights.
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lawsuit, then it will be somewhat more difficult for less affluent persons
who must pay such fees 42 to access the civil justice system than for more
affluent persons.
To the extent, then, that the principle of equality is grounded in the
status of every human being as a moral person, it does not logically
imply that the state must take affirmative steps to ensure perfectly equal
access to either elected office or to the civil justice system. The status of
personhood confers rights to life, liberty, and property that are equal to
those of any other person. But it does not confer a right to conditions that
ensure that it is no more difficult to exercise those rights than it is for
any other person. Insofar as the state is obligated to provide equal
protection of the rights associated with moral personhood, this
obligation, by itself, does not entail an obligation to provide utterly equal
access to the civil justice system. Though it is clear that there are moral
limits on the extent to which the state may permit inequality of access to
the civil justice system, it is equally clear that some inequality of access
is logically consistent with the general principle of equality as grounded
in principles regarding moral personhood. If this is correct, then SPEA is
not a logical consequence of the general principle of equality.
B. Utilitarian Theories of Legitimacy
According to utilitarianism, the moral value of any act is fully
determined by its effect on net aggregate utility among members of the
community.43 Utilitarian moral theories posit a particular state of affairs
as objectively good (i.e., the promotion of aggregate utility) and define
an act as morally right to the extent that it promotes this favored state of
affairs (i.e., to the extent that it promotes aggregate utility) and morally
wrong to the extent that it fails to promote this favored state of affairs.
Since an act's effect on utility is an extrinsic feature of the act,
44
utilitarian theories presuppose that the moral quality of an act does not
depend on its intrinsic (or inherent) features and hence that no act is
42. The qualification "who must pay such fees" accounts for the possible case where the state is
morally obligated to waive filing fees in the case of severely impoverished citizens.
43. Utility is usually defined in subjective terms of happiness, pleasure, or well-being. As we will
see in this Part, this definition creates epistemic difficulties in evaluating acts under utilitarianism.
44. An act can have radically different consequences depending on the circumstances of its
performance. For example, whether the act of giving a medication to someone promotes utility
depends on to whom the medication is given. Whereas giving chemotherapy, which is highly toxic,
to cancer patients can improve their utility, giving it to healthy persons can worsen their utility by
increasing the probability that they develop certain kinds of cancer in the long-term.
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inherently good or inherently bad. Acts are good (or bad) only insofar as
they conduce (or fail to conduce) to the utility of members in the
community.45
As a general moral theory, utilitarianism applies both to acts of
individuals and to acts of the state. Applied to the state, it implies that
the state's lawmaking authority is constrained by a duty to enact laws
that maximally promote aggregate community utility. As political
theorist Henry Sidgwick phrases the point:
[T]he true standard and criterion by which right legislation is to
be distinguished from wrong is conduciveness to the general
"good" or "welfare." And probably the great majority of persons
would agree to interpret the "good" or "welfare" of the
community to mean, in the last analysis, the happiness of the
individual human beings who compose the community; provided
that we take into account not only the human beings who are
actually living but those who are to live hereafter ....
Accordingly, ... the happiness of the persons affected [is] the
ultimate end and standard of right and wrong in determining the
functions and constitution of government.46
Utilitarian theories of legitimacy, then, assess acts of the state entirely in
terms of whether they sufficiently conduce to the favored state of affairs
(i.e., maximal promotion of utility among the citizenry). The state's sole
obligation, on this view, is to act in ways that have the effect of
maximally promoting net utility among its citizens.47
Like any other proposed state measure, the legitimacy of SPEA is thus
fully determined, according to utilitarian theories of legitimacy, by
whether it adequately promotes the utility of its citizens. Accordingly,
the test for assessing SPEA under utilitarian theories of legitimacy is
whether, other things being equal, a state that takes affirmative measures
45. This distinguishes consequentialist theories like utilitarianism from deontological theories,
which assert that the moral quality of some acts is determined entirely by their intrinsic features. On
this view, for example, lying is intrinsically wrong-and hence wrong regardless of whether it
happens to promote community utility.
46. Henry Sidgwick, Utility and Government, in SOCIAL AND POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY, supra note
29, at 35.
47. John Stuart Mill argued that considerations of utility justified the general principle that the
state can legitimately prohibit only those acts that are harmful to others. On Mill's view, utility is
most likely to be maximized in a society where people are free to develop and act on their own
conceptions of the good; people who are allowed to pursue their own values and plans are more
likely to develop the sorts of skills and abilities that will make them useful to other people. MILL,
supra note 20, chs. Il-Ill. See generally JOHN STUART MILL, UTILITARIANISM (Oxford U. Press
1998) (1871) (providing a general account of Mill's utilitarianism).
Vol. 79:31, 2004
Towards a Theory of Legitimate Access
to ensure that no one person has greater ability than any other to access
the civil justice system is more likely to maximize utility among its
citizens than a state that permits some inequality of access. If not, then it
would be illegitimate for the state to adopt SPEA as a principle of
access.
Unfortunately, the task of evaluating SPEA is complicated by the fact
that there are serious epistemic difficulties involved in assessing the
legitimacy of complex institutional practices under utilitarianism. One
difficulty is that our ability to determine in advance what the
consequences of any complex practice will be is highly limited because
there are a variety of social conditions that can causally interact with
elements of the practice in unpredictable ways; the more possible
variables there are, the more difficult it is to reliably determine which of
a substantial number of outcomes is the most likely.48 A second
difficulty is that it is just not clear how to go about making the
interpersonal utility comparisons that would have to be made in order to
properly evaluate a complex institutional practice. To determine whether
I should treat John to his favorite meal or Jane to her favorite meal, I
would have to determine whether John gets more enjoyment out of his
favorite meal than Jane gets out of hers, which requires a direct
comparison of John's and Jane's subjective mental states-something to
which only John and Jane have direct access. As Robert Goodin explains
the problem, "[i]nsofar as utility refers essentially to a state of mind ....
taking a utility reading requires me to get inside someone else's head., 4
9
Because of such difficulties, a utilitarian analysis of SPEA will have to
be limited to a comparatively rough assessment of the most salient
possible consequences; for this reason, the analysis in this subpart will
be somewhat more schematic and speculative than the analysis in the
preceding Part.5°
48. For a general discussion of such difficulties, see HEIDI HURl, MORAL COMBAT (1999)
(especially ch. 8).
49. Robert Goodin, Utility and the Good, in A COMPANION TO ETHICS 245 (Peter Singer ed.,
1991).
50. In this connection, it is worth noting that even the most famous of utilitarian arguments are
typically schematic in these respects. For example, Mill justifies his view that the only legitimate
criminal laws are those that prevent harm to others (i.e., the so-called Harm Principle) largely on the
strength of an identification of three possible consequences of allowing freedom to act in ways that
do not harm others: such freedom (1) conduces to the development of a person's rational faculties;
(2) is psychologically satisfying; and (3) conduces to debate that increases the likelihood of
discovering truth. While these are, of course, obvious possibilities, it is notable that Mill's
discussion does not (and could not, given the epistemic difficulties) go much beyond identifying
three of a fairly large number of possible outcomes. See MILL, supra note 20, chs. II-111.
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As a first step towards evaluating SPEA, it is helpful to note that legal
norms permitting attorneys to represent clients on a contingency basis5'
provide the poor with substantial access to the civil justice system.52 The
availability of representation on a contingency basis helps to ensure that
less affluent plaintiffs can obtain adequate legal representation in cases
involving serious injury that allegedly results from a defendant's breach
of duty. The ability of attorneys to recover contingency fees that, strictly
speaking, exceed the costs of their services calculated according to a
reasonable hourly rate enables them to accept cases that they could not
otherwise accept because of their uncertain outcomes. 3  The
permissibility of contingency fees thus allows less affluent plaintiffs
with economically significant injuries to access the civil justice system
in cases where the expected outcomes are comparatively uncertain.
Accordingly, the rules permitting contingency fees increase net
aggregate community utility by promoting the utility to less affluent
plaintiffs.
It is reasonable to think that net aggregate community utility could be
further increased by transferring some material resources from the most
affluent citizens to the least affluent citizens to improve the latter's
access to the civil justice system. Recent studies suggest that the poorest
citizens in the United States are underserved by the civil justice system.
For example, a 1994 survey by the American Bar Association disclosed,
among other things, that more than fifteen percent of low income
51. For example, The Washington Rules of Professional Conduct provide that "[a] fee may be
contingent on the outcome of the matter for which the service is rendered." WASH. RULES OF
PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.5(c) (2003). The rules further provide that
[a] contingent fee consisting of a percentage of the monetary amount recovered for a claimant,
in which all or part of the recovery is to be paid in the future, shall be paid only (i) by applying
the percentage to the amounts recovered as they are received by the client or (ii) by applying
the percentage to the actual cost of the settlement or award to the defendant.
Id. 1.5(c)(2).
52. Indeed, Philip Corboy argues that contingency fees are morally justified in virtue of
increasing the access of less affluent persons to the justice system. Philip H. Corboy, Contingency
Fees: The Individual's Key to the Courthouse Door, LITIG., Summer 1976, at 27; see also Peter
Karsten, Enabling the Poor To Have Their Day in Court: The Sanctioning of Contingency Fee
Contracts, a History to 1940, 47 DEPAUL L. REv. 231 (1998).
53. As a general matter, whether or not an attorney can justify accepting a contingency case on
economic grounds is determined, in part, by the probability of favorable outcomes and the
percentage of the recovered amount that the attorney can permissibly charge. The higher the
percentage, the stronger the economic justification for taking the case. See infra Part II.C (detailing
the calculation of "expected values" in prudential decision-making); see also Thomas J. Miceli &
Kathleen Segerson, Contingent Fees for Lawyers: the Impact on Litigation and Accident
Prevention, 20 J. LEGAL STUD. 381 (1991) (providing an e6onomic analysis of contingency fees).
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households have a civil legal problem that they cannot afford to formally
pursue; 54 if the results of the survey are correct, then a significant
number of the 34.5 million Americans who live in households with
incomes below the poverty level are still not being adequately served by
the civil justice system.55 Given that the poorest citizens must struggle to
satisfy their basic needs while the richest can satisfy their most
extravagant wants, one can plausibly argue that the disutility associated
with the material difficulties experienced by the poorest citizens in
attempting to enforce their rights outweighs the utility to the wealthiest
of the material resources that would collectively be needed to alleviate
some of these difficulties.
But it is also reasonable to think that the public costs associated with
alleviating each of the inconveniences experienced by all but the
wealthiest citizens outweigh the public benefits associated with
providing such citizens with easier access to the civil justice system.
Insofar as SPEA requires eliminating every relative inconvenience in
accessing the civil justice system, it will require compensating less
affluent citizens for a host of costs not incurred by the richest citizens.
SPEA would require, for example, that the state compensate the poor for
whatever wages they lose in pursuing a lawsuit because wealthier
citizens commonly receive their income in salaries that are guaranteed
and can hence take time off from work, when needed, to pursue a lawsuit
without being financially penalized by their employers. Similarly, SPEA
would require that the state compensate the poor for any miscellaneous
expenses they incur in accessing the justice system, such as unusual
transportation costs or the costs of paying for adequate childcare.
Though no studies provide a reliable basis for predicting the direct costs
of such measures, it is reasonable to hypothesize that these costs are not
trivial.
Taking these steps, however, is likely to result in further costs to
taxpayers by increasing the number of lawsuits and thereby adding to a
growing burden on the civil justice system. Because the costs associated
with pursuing a lawsuit are not insubstantial, they likely deter a
significant number of lawsuits among less affluent would-be plaintiffs.
5 6
54. CAROLYN A. ELDRED & ROY W. REESE, INST. FOR SURVEY RESEARCH AT TEMPLE UNIV.,
REPORT ON THE LEGAL NEEDS OF THE LOW-INCOME PUBLIC (1994).
55. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, POVERTY IN THE UNITED STATES: 1998, at vi (1999), available at
http://www.census.gov/prod/99pubs/p60-207.pdf.
56. This, of course, is true of any material good: the more it costs, the less likely any particular
buyer is likely to purchase it.
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Reducing these costs and their deterrent effects would make it
considerably more likely that would-be plaintiffs-at all income levels-
litigate their disputes. This would result in a significant increase in
judicial workload that would likely require more facilities and more
personnel-resources that taxpayers would ultimately have to subsidize.
Some of these increases are undoubtedly justified from a utilitarian
standpoint. If, for example, the costs associated with pursuing a lawsuit
deter many less affluent individuals from initiating suits that they would
win against more affluent defendants, reducing those costs would
increase overall utility in the community. Since the marginal utility of
money diminishes with additional increments, 57 the value of such sums
to less affluent would-be plaintiffs is greater than the value of such sums
to more affluent would-be defendants. Insofar as the relevant sums of
money are more useful to the less affluent would-be plaintiffs than to the
more affluent would-be defendants, the disutilities associated with
enabling these suits would, other things being equal, be outweighed by
the utilities.
But some of these increases probably cannot be justified from a
utilitarian standpoint. To the extent that equalizing access is likely to
increase the number of meritorious lawsuits by less affluent plaintiffs, it
is also likely to increase the number of non-meritorious lawsuits by such
plaintiffs. As a general matter, such lawsuits tend to decrease overall
utility-even apart from the costs of such litigation to taxpayers: while
the losing plaintiffs utility is at best unchanged by the loss, the winning
defendant's utility is diminished by having to expend material resources
to defend against a lawsuit that lacked an adequate basis in law. Since
non-meritorious lawsuits are rarely conducive to the utility of either
plaintiffs or defendants, increases in such lawsuits cannot be justified on
utilitarian grounds. Accordingly, to the extent that implementing SPEA
would tend to increase the number of non-meritorious lawsuits, it would
diminish net community utility.
There are,. of course, a host of additional costs associated with
devoting more resources to the civil justice system. Many citizens
believe that the existing tax burden is unfair 8 and resent being taxed for
57. See, e.g., BRANDT, supra note 39, at 380.
58. According to the most recent Harris Poll on the topic, only twenty-one percent of respondents
believe the current tax system does not need to be revised. Income Tax, Harris Poll No. 23 (Apr. 14,
1999), available at http://www.harrisinteractive.com/harris_poll/index.asp?PID=25.
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measures that effectively redistribute income.59 While one might
reasonably believe that such resentment is misplaced, it is irrelevant
from the standpoint of utilitarianism. What matters from this standpoint
is only that net aggregate community utility is diminished and the
needed tax increases are likely to significantly increase such resentment,
thereby significantly diminishing public utility. Accordingly, insofar as
the implementation of SPEA would impose burdens on taxpayers that
diminish their utility (whether measured in terms of satisfied
preferences, happiness, or pleasure), it results in further effects that
decrease net aggregate community utility.
The general thrust of these admittedly speculative considerations,
60
then, seems to point in the direction of a principle that, on the one hand,
provides less affluent citizens with more access than they currently have
but that, on the other, stops well short of providing perfectly equal
access. While the benefits associated with an increase in meritorious
lawsuits provide a plausible utilitarian argument for increasing the
access of the poor to the civil justice system, the costs associated with an
increase in non-meritorious lawsuits provide a plausible utilitarian
argument for providing somewhat less than the perfectly equal access
required by SPEA. If this is correct, then SPEA cannot be justified on
utilitarian grounds.
C. The Rawlsian Conception of Justice as Fairness
Perhaps the most fundamental idea in John Rawls's famous theory of
justice as fairness is "the idea of a society as a fair system of social
cooperation over time from one generation to the next." 61 Implicit in the
claim that society is a fair system of cooperation, as Rawls understands
that claim, are two further claims: (1) the terms that govern societal
cooperation ought to be reasonably acceptable to each participant; and
(2) those terms ought to be reasonable from the standpoint of the
participant's own prudential interests.62 Accordingly, Rawls attempts to
59. See STEVE FARKAS & JEAN JOHNSON, PUBLIC AGENDA, THE VALUES WE LIVE BY: WHAT
AMERICANS WANT FROM WELFARE REFORM (1996) (indicating that sixty percent of whites and
forty-eight percent of blacks believe that, at most, welfare should temporarily provide the "basics"
in emergency circumstances).
60. It is important to reiterate that utilitarian arguments of this sort are inevitably speculative for
the reasons discussed above in this subpart.
61. RAWLS, supra note 30, at 5.
62. ld. at 6.
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identify the fair terms of cooperation by means of a hypothetical
agreement among rational participants: in his view, the principles of
justice constraining the state's lawmaking activities are those that would
be chosen by rational persons in an "original position.,
63
The crucial idea of the original position is defined by three elements
of normative theoretical importance. First, persons in the original
position must be free and equal so as to preclude any unfair bargaining
advantages among the parties. As Rawls points out, "if it is to be a valid
agreement from the point of view of political justice[,] . . . these
conditions must situate free and equal persons fairly and must not permit
some to have unfair bargaining advantages over others."
64
Second, persons in the original position are assumed to be concerned
only to maximize their own interests, and are not assumed to take an
interest in the welfare of other persons. 65 The reason is that the most that
can be assumed about the motivations of human beings is that they are
motivated by their own prudential interests. While many humans are
motivated by altruistic considerations, not all are. To ensure that the
principles chosen by persons in the original position are universally
acceptable, Rawls defines the original position in such a way that the
only psychological assumptions on which it depends are true of every
human being.
Third, and most importantly, persons in the original position are
shielded from information about their own contingent abilities and
circumstances by the so-called veil of ignorance.66 Persons behind the
veil of ignorance do not know, for example, how smart, athletic,
physically attractive, socially adept, wealthy, or healthy they are. As
Rawls describes this feature of the original position:
[N]o one knows his place in society, his class position or social
status; nor does he know his fortune in the distribution of natural
assets and abilities, his intelligence and strength, and the like.
Nor again does anyone know his conception of the good, the
particulars of his rational plan of life, or even the special features
of his psychology such as his aversion to risk or liability to
optimism or pessimism. More than this, I assume that the parties
do not know the particular circumstances of their own society.
63. RAWLS, supra note 19, at 15-19.
64. RAWLS, supra note 30, at 15.
65. RAWLS, supra note 19, at 10.
66. Id. at 118.
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That is, they do not know its economic or political situation, or
the level of civilization and culture it has been able to achieve.
The persons in the original position have no information as to
which generation they belong.
67
Persons in the original position, then, know nothing about the abilities
and properties that distinguish them from other persons. In effect, such
persons know no more about themselves than they do about any other
person; what knowledge they have about themselves is limited to
knowledge of those properties that they share with every other person.
The point of the veil of ignorance is to seal off information that is
irrelevant as far as justice is concerned.68 Although the principles of
justice are chosen by rational agents concerned only to advance their
own interests, they must do so only on the basis of information that is
morally relevant. Information about people's intellectual abilities is
morally irrelevant because those abilities depend largely on
circumstances over which they have little control: who their parents, are,
where they were born, and how much education they have are largely
matters of luck. While such fortuitous circumstances are, of course,
relevant with respect to one's prudential deliberations, they are irrelevant
with respect to one's moral deliberations-and the choice of principles
of justice is ultimately a moral choice. Accordingly, persons in the
original position must choose principles that will advance their interests
no matter what abilities and propensities they turn out to have.
The imposition of the veil of ignorance prevents persons in the
original position from adopting an interest-maximizing principle for
pursuing their prudential interests. In conditions of full information,
rationally self-interested agents can pursue a strategy that aims at
67. Id.
68. As Rawls puts this important point:
[lit seems reasonable and generally acceptable that no one should be advantaged or
disadvantaged by natural fortune or social circumstances in the choice of principles. It
also seems widely agreed that it should be impossible to tailor principles to the
circumstances of one's own case. We should insure further that particular inclinations
and aspirations, and persons' conceptions of their good do not affect the principles
adopted. The aim is to rule out those principles that it would be rational to propose for
acceptance, however little the chance of success, only if one knew certain things that are
irrelevant from the standpoint of justice. For example, if a man knew that he was
wealthy, he might find it rational to advance the principle that various taxes for welfare
measures be counted unjust; if he knew that he was poor, he would most likely propose
the contrary principle.
Id. at 16-17.
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maximizing their own utility. In particular, such agents can assess the
expected value of each act A by calculating the differential between the
expected benefit of A (i.e., the magnitude of the benefit associated with
A multiplied by its probability) and the expected cost of A (i.e., the
magnitude of the cost associated with A multiplied by its probability)
and selecting the act with the highest expected value. 69 By selecting the
act with the highest expected value, agents optimize their prospects for
maximizing their own utility.
In conditions of highly restricted information, however, rationally
self-interested agents must adopt a more conservative "maximin"
strategy and choose behaviors that are minimally necessary to protect
themselves against highly undesirable outcomes. As Rawls describes it,
the maximin strategy "tells us to identify the worst outcome of each
available alternative and then to adopt the alternative whose worst
outcome is better than the worst outcomes of all the other alternatives. 7 °
The maximin rule, unlike the ordinary prudential strategy of maximizing
expected value, takes into account only the relative magnitude of the
worst possible outcomes; it does not take into account any information
that assesses the comparative probabilities of the various options because
such information is not available. In effect, then, rationally self-
interested agents deploy the maximin strategy as a means for avoiding
the worst of undesirable outcomes.
While some authors argue that the maximin strategy is not the only
rational strategy applicable in situations of high risk and uncertainty, 71 it
should be clear that the maximin strategy is rationally deployed in such
situations. A somewhat perverse example is helpful in illustrating the
point. From the standpoint of prudential rationality alone, 72 it is rational
69. While agents do not typically ground their behavior in explicit mathematical calculations of
probability, this is true for a variety of reasons that do not call the general principle into question.
First, in most instances, the relevant probabilities are known to be 1. For example, the probability of
the only material cost of a candy bar-its price-is I. Second, in circumstances in which the
material probabilities are not known to be i, the agent has only a rough feel for the relevant values.
In such situations, the role that explicit calculations normally play is played by a rough intuitive
process of weighing the outcomes.
70. RAWLS, supra note 30, at 97.
71. See, e.g., John C. Harsanyi, Can the Maximin Principle Serve as a Basis for Morality?: A
Critique of John Rawls 's Theory, 69 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 594 (1975).
72. The standpoint of prudential rationality seeks nothing more than the maximization of one's
own interests. While it is probably true that a purely prudential standpoint is rarely appropriate, it is
crucial to realize here that moral considerations are not relevant with respect to making purely
prudential decisions. Accordingly, the following example brackets any considerations of morality,
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for someone with full information to play the most dangerous games if
the prize is large enough and the odds of losing are remote enough.
Whether it is prudentially rational, for example, to play a game of
Russian roulette with one bullet depends on the amount of the prize and
on the number of empty chambers in the gun. While it would clearly be
irrational to play if I know the prize is one dollar and there is only one
empty chamber in the gun, it is clearly rational to play if I know the prize
is one hundred million dollars and there are six billion empty
chambers; 73 one incurs a substantially greater risk of death every time
one gets into an automobile. In these cases, there is sufficient
information to adopt an interest-maximizing strategy that will sometimes
dictate playing the game. But a more conservative maximin strategy is
appropriate from the standpoint of prudential rationality if I lack
information about some of the salient probabilities. For example, if I am
not told how many empty chambers there are in the gun, it is clearly
rational to adopt a maximin strategy that requires me to decline the game
as a means of avoiding the worst of undesirable outcomes.
Although the motivation for the veil of ignorance is largely moral, its
effect on the deliberations of agents in the original position is prudential
in character. Since the veil of ignorance denies people any information
about themselves that would tell-them how likely they are to win or lose
in society, they must adopt a more conservative prudential strategy for
selecting the principles of justice than the interest-maximizing strategy
that is available in conditions of full information. They must, as a matter
of prudential rationality, choose those principles that are minimally
necessary to enable them to avoid the very worst outcomes. Since a
maximin strategy will enable them to do this, it is rationally deployed by
agents in the original position.
Rawls believes that persons in the original position will avoid the very
worst outcomes by choosing a principle that affords them maximum
liberty compatible with everyone else's having comparable liberty and a
principle that assures that economic inequalities will conduce to their
benefit no matter where they wind up in society. According to the
which would function to deter the agent from playing the game. The only issue in deciding whether
or not to play is whether doing so maximally conduces to one's self-interest.
73. This is subject to one qualification: if one believes that God exists and punishes suicide with
eternal and infinite suffering in hell, then the expected cost of the game is infinite no matter how
small the probability of losing. Since a finite expected benefit is infinitesimally small relative to an
infinite expected cost, it is irrational to play the game on such theistic assumptions no matter how
big the prize and how small the probability of losing.
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Liberty Principle, "each person is to have an equal right to the most
extensive scheme of equal basic liberties compatible with similar
liberties for others. 74 According to the Difference Principle, "social and
economic inequalities are to be arranged so that they are both (a)
reasonably expected to be to everyone's advantage, and (b) attached to
positions and offices open to all.",75 Persons in the original position thus
use a maximin strategy to enable them to avoid catastrophic situations in
which their freedom is denied or in which economic inequalities are
permitted at their expense.
To evaluate SPEA from the standpoint of someone in the original
position, then, we need to identify the worst outcomes of all the available
alternatives to determine whether the worst outcomes under SPEA are
preferable to the worst outcomes under all other principles. At the outset,
it is easy to identify the very worst outcome: the very worst outcome is a
catastrophic situation in which one has been severely injured by the
negligent or willful behavior of another party and cannot enforce one's
right to compensation because one cannot access the civil justice system.
In such circumstances, people have lost their capacity to make livings
and lead meaningful lives because of the culpable behavior of another
person, but cannot exercise their right to compensation from the former
because they lack access to the civil justice system that would enforce
their rights against the responsible party. Parties in this situation have no
guarantee that they can even feed themselves; in a very literal sense,
then, the very worst possible outcome is potentially life-threatening.
There are a number of principles that would permit this catastrophic
outcome. This, for example, is the worst possible outcome of any
principle that excludes, on its face, persons in any particular group from
all access to the civil justice system for any reason whatsoever. But it is
also the worst possible outcome of any principle that arbitrarily
conditions access to the justice system upon the payment of a fee that is
sizable enough to ensure that the least affluent people in a society cannot
afford access to the justice system.76 To avoid this outcome, then, a
person in the original position must select a principle that assures that no
class of persons is excluded from access to the civil justice system either
74. RAWLS, supra note 19, at 53.
75. Id.
76. The reason for the qualifier "arbitrarily" is that, as will be argued below, people in the original
position would not accept an absolute principle that requires the public to subsidize the access of the
least affluent citizens because they have to guard against a situation in which they must sacrifice
important material needs to subsidize another person's access. See infra this Part & Part III.C.
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for reasons of class membership or for financial reasons not related to
the costs of such access and the quantity of material resources generally
available to the society.
SPEA clearly satisfies this criterion. Insofar as SPEA assures that
every person has perfectly equal access to the civil justice system, it is
logically inconsistent with any principle that excludes, on its face,
persons in any particular group from access to justice for whatever
reason. Further, insofar as SPEA guarantees minimal access to the
justice system, it is logically inconsistent with any principle that
conditions access to the justice system upon payment of a fee sizable
enough to permit some, but not all, to access the justice system.
While selecting SPEA would clearly enable an agent to avoid the very
worst outcomes, SPEA is nonetheless problematic from the standpoint of
someone in the original position. The worst outcomes under SPEA,
though not as bad as the worst outcomes of a principle that has the effect
of arbitrarily denying some persons access to the civil justice system, are
sufficiently undesirable that a rationally self-interested agent would seek
to avoid them from the original position. Because it is clear that the costs
of perfectly equal access are substantial, they will have to be borne by
comparatively affluent citizens. Accordingly, it is conceivable under
SPEA that more affluent citizens will have to make significant material
sacrifices to pay their share of the very substantial costs of perfectly
equal access. While this will probably not require a person to defer
satisfaction of a basic material need, it may require a person to defer or
even give up satisfaction of a want that is sufficiently urgent or
passionate as to provoke considerable unhappiness and resentment in the
agent.77
In this connection, it is helpful to observe that although persons in the
original position have some understanding of political and economic
theory,78 they "do not know the particular circumstances of their own
77. Such a reaction would, for example, be quite natural in someone who sees a similarity
between taxation for redistributive purposes and forced labor. As Robert Nozick expresses the
similarity:
Seizing the results of someone's labor is equivalent to seizing hours from him and
directing him to carry on various activities .... This process whereby they take this
decision from you makes them apart-owner of you; it gives them a property right in you.
Just as having such partial control and power of decision, by right, over an animal or
inanimate object would be to have a property right in it.
NOZICK, supra note 24, at 172.
78. RAWLS, supra note 19, at 119.
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society. '79 That means that they do not know whether the societies in
which they live are comparatively prosperous or comparatively poor.
Since they are thus shielded from any information that would tell them
whether their tax burdens in subsidizing perfectly equal access will
require significant sacrifices, the maximin strategy requires them to
guard against the worst outcome-a state of affairs in which they have to
sacrifice some of their most important wants to pay their share of the
costs of perfectly equal access. Such prospects, then, provide rational
self-interested agents in the original position with a powerful incentive to
look for another principle that avoids such outcomes.
Moreover, it is clear that there are alternative principles that would
avoid the very worst outcome of being denied access to the civil justice
system. As it turns out, SPEA is not the least restrictive principle that
would avoid these outcomes. Any principle that guarantees that people
will not arbitrarily be denied access to the civil justice system will enable
them to avoid the very worst outcome of being denied access to civil
justice when it cannot be justified by considerations having to do with
the costs of access and the quantity of resources available to society. 80
Since such a principle is logically compatible with allowing some
inequality of access, a person in the original position need not choose a
principle that, in effect, guarantees that no person will have more
convenient access to the civil justice system than any other person.
For these reasons, it is reasonable to think that SPEA would not be
chosen by a rationally self-interested agent in the original position. Since
the worst outcomes under SPEA involve significant disadvantage, a
rationally self-interested agent would prefer any other principle that
avoids the very worst possible outcome without allowing another
outcome as disadvantageous as the worst outcome under SPEA. Further,
since there are less burdensome principles than SPEA that avoid the very
worst outcome, it is reasonable to think that someone adopting a
maximin strategy would select one of these other principles.
Accordingly, the adoption of SPEA cannot be justified by Rawls's
theory of justice.
79. Id. at 118.
80. See supra note 76 (explaining the qualifier "arbitrarily").
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III. TOWARDS A THEORY OF ACCESS: TWO PRINCIPLES
This part of the Article argues that the three different approaches to
legitimacy converge on two principles that state necessary conditions for
minimally legitimate access to the civil justice system. The first principle
defines a negative obligation that requires only that the state refrain from
certain types of action:
The Equality Principle (EP): The state is morally obligated not
to exclude any person from access to any resource provided by
the civil justice system for reasons that explicitly or implicitly
deny the equal moral status of every human being.
As is readily evident, EP does not guarantee any positive right to access
any particular resource; it requires only that the state not discriminate
with respect to what resources it provides for reasons inconsistent with
the moral equality of every human being.
Insofar as EP is therefore consistent with a state of affairs in which no
person has access to any legal resources whatsoever, it operates in the
following way. While EP does not require the state to provide access to
any resources at all, it prohibits excluding people from access to any
resource the state does provide for reasons that deny their status as moral
persons. 81 For example, while EP does not guarantee access to some
resource to women, it implies that women may not be excluded from
access to that resource for reasons that are sexist in character. To the
extent, then, that any other class of human beings has access to that
particular resource, EP requires that women must be afforded access to it
unless there is some reason for excluding them that is not sexist in
character.
By itself, satisfaction of EP could not be sufficient for morally
legitimate access according to the adequacy condition described above at
the end of Part I. As observed there, most classically liberal theories
presuppose that the legitimizing function of the state is to promote the
common good by serving the prudential interests of its citizens. Because
this requires the state, at a minimum, to establish and protect legal rights
in a manner that endows those rights with some prudential value to its
citizens, no set of access principles can be sufficient for legitimate access
without guaranteeing the prudential value of legal rights to the rights-
holders. Because EP is logically compatible with a state of affairs in
81. As argued above, it is a human being's status as a moral person that ensures his or her moral
equality with every other human being. See supra Part I.
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which no one has access to any legal resources and hence with a state of
affairs in which no one has the ability to activate the legal consequences
that endow legal rights with prudential value, EP could not exhaust the
conditions of morally legitimate access.
Accordingly, EP must be supplemented with a principle guaranteeing
that citizens have sufficient access to the civil justice system to endow
their legal rights with prudential value. What is needed, then, to
adequately define a minimally legitimate right of access is a principle
that defines a positive right of access to what is minimally needed to
activate the relevant legal consequences.82 The following principle is an
affirmative norm that purports to do exactly that:
The Reasonable Access Principle (RAP): The state is obligated
to provide every person with reasonable access to all resources
that are minimally necessary (1) to develop an informed
plausible view about their legal rights and responsibilities and
(2) to competently prosecute or defend lawsuits implicating their
rights or responsibilities.
The operative concept of reasonableness in RAP is intended to govern
the distribution of costs among citizens and should be understood as
incorporating the following principles. 83 First, the costs to any one
citizen of subsidizing another citizen's access should not be greater than
the benefit to the latter and should not, in any case, require the former to
sacrifice satisfaction of needs or wants vital to well-being. Second,
subsidized access is reasonable only to the extent that its aggregate
public benefits exceed its aggregate public costs. Third, citizens should
not be forced by their own economic circumstances to forgo access to
minimally necessary legal resources when they have vital material
interests at stake in being able to defend legal positions unless access to
these resources cannot be subsidized consistently with the first two
principles. In effect, the first two principles define limits on the extent to
which the state can coercively require more affluent citizens to subsidize
the access of less affluent citizens to the civil justice system; the last
principle defines an affirmative obligation to transfer resources, subject
82. This assumes, of course, that the relevant legal consequences have prudential value. If the
legal consequences lack prudential value, then the ability to activate those consequences also lacks
prudential value.
83. What is and is not "reasonable" is determined by recourse to substantive normative standards.
As the term is normally used, the relevant standards include moral principles of fairness. To say, for
example, that people are behaving in a manner that is unreasonable, on this ordinary usage, is partly
to say that they are behaving unfairly.
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to the first two principles, to ensure that the poorest citizens can defend
vital material interests.
84
Thus construed, RAP is sufficient to endow legal rights with positive
prudential value to all rights-holders and hence satisfies the relevant
adequacy condition. Regardless of how costs are distributed among the
citizenry, RAP defines an unconditional obligation on the part of the
state to provide every citizen with access to every resource minimally
necessary to defend a plausible legal position. Accordingly, RAP defines
a positive right on the part of every citizen to have access to resources
that, taken together, are sufficient to enable a competent adult to defend
an informed legal position. 85 By itself, this assures that rational self-
interested agents are able, in principle, to activate the legal consequences
that endow legal rights with prudential value and hence, together with
the prudential value of those consequences, guarantees the prudential
value of legal rights.
Even so, it is important to emphasize that EP and RAP do not purport
to exhaust the state's obligations with respect to access. The claim here
is that satisfaction of EP and RAP is necessary for a state's civil justice
practices to be legitimate, and not that satisfaction of EP and RAP is
sufficient for a state's civil justice practices to be legitimate. Strictly
speaking, EP and RAP are compatible with the existence of additional
principles that must be satisfied by the state for its civil justice practices
to be legitimate-though, as we have seen, such principles will not
include SPEA.86 In this sense, EP and RAP represent just a step towards
84. The rationale for defining "reasonable" in terms of whether certain benefits exceed certain
costs is that the ordinary sense of the term incorporates substantive moral content and is hence
incompatible with both utilitarianism and Rawls's theory. It is incompatible with utilitarianism
because utilitarianism assumes that all moral qualities of an act are fully determined by its effects on
community utility. It is incompatible with Rawls's view because persons in the original position are
screened from their own particular moral views and are thus not in a position to agree on any
principle that incorporates moral content. But while the operative notion is defined in purely non-
normative terms, we will see that it is morally justified on each of the three conceptions of
legitimacy. Thus, although the notion does not explicitly incorporate any substantive moral ideals, I
will argue below that it satisfies three different sets of them. See infra Part III.A-C.
85. Taken together, all the resources that are minimally necessary to develop and defend a legal
position are minimally sufficient to do so. People who have access to every resource that is
minimally necessary have access to everything they need in order to develop and defend legal
positions; it follows that they have access to materials that are minimally sufficient to develop and
defend legal positions.
86. Indeed, it is reasonable to think that the state is morally obligated to provide more resources to
persons who are not sufficiently competent to defend their own interests; as is readily evident, EP
and RAP are utterly indifferent with respect to such requirements.
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a general theory of morally legitimate access, and not a fully
comprehensive theory of legitimate access.
A. The General Principle of Equality
EP is a straightforward corollary of the general principle of equality.
As will be recalled, the general principle of equality affirms the moral
equality of all human beings qua persons and hence requires that every
human being be treated with equal respect-an obligation that applies to
both persons and states. It is clear, as a logical matter, that any behavior
towards human beings for reasons that deny them equal status as moral
persons is inconsistent with the obligation to treat them with equal
respect. The obligation to treat all persons with equal respect requires, at
the very least, respect for their status as moral persons with full and
complete sets of rights. To the extent, then, that the state is morally
obligated to treat every human being with equal respect, it follows that
the state may not exclude any person from any resource provided by the
civil justice system for any reasons that explicitly or implicitly deny the
equal moral status of every human being.87
While the principle of equality does not logically imply RAP, RAP
coheres with the principle of equality and is hence justified by it. The
obligation to treat each person with equal respect implies, afortiori, an
obligation to treat each person with respect, and minimal moral respect
for a person requires respect for his or her autonomy.88 Insofar as moral
personhood confers upon a person full membership in the moral
community with a complete set of moral rights and responsibilities, it
entitles that person to respect for at least those decisions that do not
violate the rights of other persons. Indeed, it is hard to make sense of the
idea that one could treat a person with morally minimal respect without a
commitment not to interfere with those decisions and behaviors that do
not in any way implicate the rights of others. 89
87. See supra Part II.A.
88. Most deontological theories of legitimacy treat autonomy as a basic value. John Rawls, for
example, presupposes that agents in the original position are fully autonomous-a feature that is
necessary to ensure the moral validity of the agreement on principles of justice. See JOHN RAWLS,
POLITICAL LIBERALISM 77-81 (1993). In contrast, consequentialist theories protect autonomy only
insofar as it conduces to the relevant favored state of affairs. Since the general principle of equality
discussed here is a deontological one derived from deontological considerations about moral
personhood, it is reasonable to infer that it requires minimal respect for autonomy.
89. To say this is not, however, to presuppose any particular conception of what rights others
have. Such rights may be quite expansive as political liberals believe or less expansive as political
conservatives believe. Thus, for instance, this statement is agnostic with respect to whether
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Respect for autonomy clearly requires that the state provide people
with access in principle to what is minimally needed to adequately
defend their legal interests. The obligation to respect autonomy
undoubtedly implies substantive limits on the state's legitimate
lawmaking abilities; it presumably requires, at the very least, that the
laws of the state allow persons a certain level of freedom to frame,
express, and execute their own values as long as doing so does not
violate the rights of others. But if respect for autonomy requires allowing
people to steer their own course, it also requires, a fortiori, allowing
people to steer their own course with respect to developing and
defending informed and plausible legal positions. Since it is, by
definition, impossible for people to develop and defend informed and
plausible legal positions without having access to what is minimally
necessary to do so, the state is obligated to allow, as a matter of
principle, each citizen access to those resources that are necessary (1) to
develop informed plausible views about their legal rights and
responsibilities or (2) to prosecute or defend lawsuits implicating their
rights or responsibilities.
It is, however, not enough that the state allows such access in
principle; it must also take morally reasonable steps to ensure that every
citizen can, as a practical matter, access the justice system when needed
to defend legal interests that are vital to well-being. 90 If the state is going
to limit the options available to citizens for defending their vital interests
by coercively enforcing a monopoly over the use of force in resolving
disputes, then it must ensure that each citizen has morally reasonable
access to what is minimally needed to defend his or her vital interests
without resorting to force. It would be unfair for the state to preempt
citizens' ability to coercively defend their own interests without ensuring
that they have morally reasonable opportunities to avail themselves of
the state's civil justice system. The obligation of equal respect seems to
imply that the state take morally reasonable steps to ensure that all
citizens are able to access the civil justice system (and hence the state's
monopoly on coercive force) when their vital interests are at stake.
consenting adults have an unrestricted right to engage in sexual relations-a subject of dispute
between political conservatives and political liberals.
90. Because we are talking about what is required by deontological principles, the appropriate
notion of reasonableness is the ordinary one that incorporates moral principles of fairness. I will
argue that the principles that define the notion as it appears in RAP are reasonable in the ordinary
moral sense of the word.
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But given that the costs of providing access to such resources must
ultimately be borne by citizens, there are limits to how much the state
can, as a moral matter, reasonably demand from one class of citizens by
way of subsidizing the access of another class of citizens. 9 1 Equal respect
for those whose incomes will have to be coercively taxed to subsidize
such access surely entails limits on how much they may be taxed for
such purposes; it seems clear, for example, that citizens could not
legitimately be required to pay ninety percent of their incomes to assure
some utopian level of access to the civil justice system.
If it is not entirely clear exactly where to draw the line on how much
citizens can legitimately be taxed to ensure that others have adequate
access, RAP certainly expresses a plausible candidate for such a limit.
Equal respect for each citizen seems to require that no citizen be forced
to absorb a cost that is greater than the benefit it makes possible to
another citizen. Respect for citizens' autonomy seems to mandate that
they not be asked to subsidize other persons' access if it requires them to
sacrifice interests vital to their own well-being. Finally, respect for
citizen autonomy seems to require recognition of the sacrifices that must
be made to earn a living; coercively taxing citizens beyond the point
where the public benefits exceed the public costs seems to squander
those citizens' hard-earned resources and hence seems inconsistent with
any principle that requires recognition of the sacrifices they must make
to earn a living. If this is correct, then RAP is, at the very least,
presumptively justified under the general principle of equality.
B. Utilitarian Theories of Legitimacy
Utilitarian moral theories, including utilitarian theories of legitimacy,
presuppose a principle of equal respect: according to this principle, no
person's utility-whether measured in terms of pleasure, happiness, or
well-being-may be accorded greater weight in moral deliberations than
any other person's interests. As Peter Singer phrases this important
point:
[W]hen I make an ethical judgment [under utilitarian moral
theories,] I must go beyond a personal or sectional point of view
and take into account the interests of all those affected [by our
actions]. This means that we weigh up interests, considered
simply as interests and not as my interests, or the interests of
91. Again the relevant sense of "reasonable" here is the ordinary sense. See supra note 90.
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Australians, or of people of European descent. This provides us
with a basic principle of equality: the principle of equal
consideration... [requires] that we give equal weight in our
moral deliberations to the like interests of all those affected by
92
our actions.
Whatever it is, then, that confers membership in the community of moral
persons according to utilitarianism, 93 it requires that every moral agent,
individual or institutional, accord each person equal respect by assigning
as much weight to that person's utility as to any other person's utility.
94
Interpreted in light of this foundational commitment, utilitarian
theories of legitimacy clearly imply EP. The argument is
straightforward. Insofar as the state excludes any person from access to
some legal resource for a reason that denies the equal moral status of
every human being, it disregards the utility of that person relative to
those of other persons. To utterly exclude someone from a resource for
such reasons is to do so without any regard for whether access to that
resource would conduce to her utility. But disregarding the utility of one
person P in making a moral decision about her is equivalent in effect to a
strong form of discounting P's utility relative to the utility of other
persons; it has exactly the same effect as always assigning no value to
P's utility because it makes decisions about how to treat P turn entirely
on the consequences to the utility of other persons.95 Since the state is
therefore obligated not to disregard the utility of any person under
utilitarianism and since the state cannot exclude a person from access to
legal resources for any reason that denies her equality without utter
disregard for that person's utility, it follows that the state is obligated not
to disregard a person's utility for a reason that denies her equality.
92. PETER SINGER, PRACTICAL ETHICS 21 (2d ed. 1993).
93. While this is sometimes thought to involve the capacity for rationality, Peter Singer argues
that the capacity for suffering confers a right to equal consideration on animals. See id. ch. 2.
94. Indeed, this feature of utilitarianism has frequently been criticized as setting a standard that is
unreasonably high. For example, Bernard Williams argues that the duty of equal consideration
requires persons to subordinate the projects that give meaning to their lives in order to promote the
utility of other persons and is hence inconsistent with respect for autonomy. Thus, for example,
utilitarianism would require me to give up philosophy, which I love, to study medicine, which I do
not, if doing so would maximally promote utility. See J.I.C. SMART & BERNARD WILLIAMS,
UTILITARIANISM: FOR AND AGAINST (1973).
95. For example, a state that denies women the right to vote on the ground that women do not
have the same moral status as men has effectively excluded women from voting for reasons that
have nothing to do with the utility to women of being able to vote and everything to do with the
utility to men of women not being allowed to vote.
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Accordingly, if utilitarianism's principle of equal consideration is true,
then EP must also be true.
To justify RAP from the standpoint of utilitarianism, we need to go
beyond utilitarianism's formal commitment to equal respect and assess
the relevant utilities and disutilities. Utilitarianism, as will be recalled,
defines the moral value of an act entirely in terms of its extrinsic effects
on community well-being. Thus, utilitarian theories of legitimacy imply
that the sole obligation of the state is to act in ways that maximally
promote net aggregate utility among its citizens. While EP can be
justified as a logical consequence of utilitarianism's principle of equal
consideration, RAP is not a logical consequence of this principle because
it is consistent with much stronger principles like SPEA.96 For this
reason, whether RAP is justified under utilitarianism depends entirely on
its effects on net aggregate community utility.
RAP's guarantee of access to resources that suffice to enable a
competent adult to defend a legal position promotes the utility of
potential plaintiffs. 97 Rational agents would experience significant
disutility if seriously injured by the culpable conduct of someone they
could not sue because they lacked access to the necessary legal
resources. It is important to note, however, that the relevant disutilities
are not limited to the obvious ones associated with not being able to
extract compensation from the culpable party, which are greater for less
affluent would-be plaintiffs than for more affluent would-be plaintiffs.
They also include the resentment that naturally accompanies being
denied access to the civil justice system when needed to hold a culpable
party accountable for serious injuries, which are presumably as
significant for more affluent would-be plaintiffs as they are for less
affluent would-be plaintiffs.
For similar reasons, RAP's guarantee of access generally promotes
the utility of potential defendants. Rational agents would incur
significant disutility if they were defendants in a civil lawsuit seeking
substantial money damages without having access to the resources
96. It is a basic theorem of logic that if each of two inconsistent propositions is consistent with a
proposition A, then A implies neither of those propositions. For example, the proposition that apples
are red is inconsistent with the proposition that George Bush is president and with the proposition
that George Bush is not president. Hence the proposition that apples are red does not imply either of
those latter propositions. See, e.g., ELLIOT MENDELSON, INTRODUCTION TO MATHEMATICAL LOGIC
(4th ed. 1997).
97. It should be recalled here that access to every resource minimally necessary for such purposes
implies access to resources that, taken together, are minimally sufficient for such purposes. See
supra note 85.
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needed to pursue plausible legal defenses. As before, the relevant
disutilities are not limited to those associated with the unfavorable
outcome-though having to pay substantial money damages is
undeniably a very unhappy outcome for most people. They also include
the significant unhappiness most people would experience at the very
prospect of not being able to tell their sides of the story because they are
denied access to the civil justice system.98
Nevertheless, a positive right of access also creates theoretically
significant disutilities. Insofar as RAP requires that people have access
to every resource minimally necessary to defend an informed legal
position, it requires that the state incur significant expenses that must be
passed on to taxpayers. As one might expect, the costs to the state of
creating, sustaining, and making accessible resources it would not
otherwise have to worry about are substantial. A recent survey showed
that the direct costs of tort litigation in the United States reached $205
billion in 2001-2.04% of the gross domestic product that year;99 given
that tort disputes are only one source of civil litigation, one can expect
that the costs are significantly higher for civil litigation as a whole. But
insofar as the costs of such resources have to be borne by taxpayers, the
provision of those very resources impose disutilities on the very persons
who are supposed to benefit from those resources; indeed, the direct
costs to each U.S. citizen of tort litigation was $721 in that year,
1°°
which amounted to a "litigation tax" of almost $2900 for a family of
four. As is readily evident, these costs impose significant disutilities on
the very citizens who stand to benefit from RAP.
Even so, it seems clear that the utilities outweigh the disutilities for
most people-at least if their behavior in other contexts is any
indication. Most people, for example, experience considerable
unhappiness at even the prospect of developing a serious illness without
being able to afford appropriate medical care. To eliminate this prospect,
people who can afford it typically purchase health insurance despite the
substantial disutility it imposes in the form of expensive monthly
premiums. While it is unfortunately true that there are too many
98. This class of disutilities helps to explain why rights matter so much to us: they give us peace
of mind by purporting to diminish (if not eliminate) the prospect that some evil will be done to us.
99. TILLINGHAST-TOWERS PERRIN, U.S. TORT COSTS: 2002 UPDATE-TRENDS AND FINDINGS ON
THE COSTS OF THE U.S. TORT SYSTEM 7 (2003), available at
http://www.towersperrin.com/tillinghast/publications/reports/2002 TortCostsUpdate/TortCosts_
2002_Updaterev.pdf.
100. Id. at 11.
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Americans without adequate health insurance,' 0 it is because they
cannot afford it-and not because they do not want it. Rational self-
interested persons are typically willing to shift material resources, when
they can afford to do so, from the pursuit of other material goods to
purchase insurance policies that protect them against the risk of incurring
very significant disutilities. Indeed, this is why insurance companies are
typically profitable to begin with.
The same sort of reasoning applies to RAP. While the provision of
such resources must be subsidized by taxpayers at considerable expense
to themselves, it is reasonable to hypothesize that taxpayers regard the
disutility associated with the costs of such measures as being
significantly outweighed by the utility that comes with the peace of mind
of knowing that one will not find oneself in a situation in which one
needs to develop and defend a plausible legal position but cannot do so
because one is denied access to what is minimally needed to do so. RAP
can thus be justified under utilitarian theories of legitimacy in the same
way that the purchase of health insurance can be justified by comparison
of the relevant utilities and disutilities associated with buying and not
buying it.
Of course, there is one difference between the two situations. Whereas
individuals are typically responsible for only the costs of their own
health insurance, RAP will sometimes make some individuals
responsible for the costs of ensuring effective access of other
individuals. Insofar as RAP authorizes the state to require that one class
of citizens subsidize the access of another class of citizens, it contains a
redistributive element that could arguably give rise to significant
disutility in the form of resentment among those who must subsidize the
access of other persons.
Nevertheless, RAP minimizes the risk that such disutilities would
ultimately outweigh the utilities of subsidized access by sharply limiting
the extent to which any citizen can be asked to subsidize the access of
less affluent citizens. For starters, RAP does not permit the state to
require one citizen to subsidize another's access when doing so would
force the citizen to sacrifice the satisfaction of important material wants.
In addition, RAP attempts to ensure that transfers of wealth are cost-
efficient in two important respects-one individual and the other
101. According to a recent U.S. Census Bureau report, 43.6 million Americans went without
health insurance in 2002. See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, HEALTH INSURANCE COVERAGE IN THE
UNITED STATES: 2002 1 (2003), available at http://www.census.gov/prod/2003pubs/p60-223.pdf.
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collective. First, RAP ensures that an individual will never be asked to
bear a personal cost that is out of proportion to the benefit to others.
Second, RAP ensures that the community as a whole will not be taxed
for measures that do not result in aggregate public benefits that exceed
their aggregate public costs. These features of RAP diminish the risk of
significant citizen resentment by reducing the likelihood that citizens
will regard their responsibility for subsidizing other citizens' access as
unfair or excessive-natural sources of the sort of resentment that might
ultimately undermine RAP's justifiability under utilitarian principles.
For such reasons, it is plausible to conclude that RAP is justified under
utilitarian theories of legitimacy.
Even so, the possibility of such public resentment calls attention to
one potentially troubling feature of RAP. Insofar as consideration of
public costs includes such subjective factors as taxpayer resentment,
RAP implies that redistributive measures that guarantee effective access
for less affluent citizens are justified only to the extent that they are
minimally acceptable to the taxpaying public. While it would take
considerable unhappiness on the part of taxpayers to outweigh the
obvious utilities that such redistributive measures create, one can
conceive of states of affairs in which taxpayer resentment exceeds the
utility of such access to the poor. If, for example, taxpayers are
sufficiently self-centered and beneficiaries are sufficiently disinterested,
taxpayer resentment would outweigh the utilities to the poor of having
effective access to the civil justice system. In that situation, RAP would
not authorize the state to adopt redistributive measures to ensure that less
affluent citizens can afford to access the civil justice system-though, of
course, RAP would in such circumstances guarantee them access in
principle.
Indeed, one might be tempted to think that this admittedly disturbing
possibility constitutes a counterexample that refutes RAP, but this would
be a mistake. As unfortunate as this state of affairs would admittedly be,
it is compatible with other important shared moral commitments. For
example, such a state of affairs is compatible with the general principle
of equality and the underlying principles defining the status of moral
personhood; 0 2 as argued in the last subpart, respect for people's
autonomy limits what can be coercively required from them by way of
material contribution to the well-being of other persons. If a comparison
102. As we will see in the next subpart, it also harmonizes nicely with Rawls's conception of
justice as fairness.
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of relevant benefits and costs is not the ultimate standard of morality, it
certainly limits the extent to which the resources of one person can
legitimately be transferred by coercive measures like taxation to promote
the utility of other persons. For this reason, it would arguably be wrong
for the state to coercively require one set of persons to subsidize access
for other persons if the public costs exceeded the public benefits. 10 3
Thus, the worst-case scenario under utilitarianism is not a
counterexample that warrants rejecting RAP.
C. The Rawlsian Conception of Justice as Fairness
As will be recalled, the principles of justice defining the state's
legitimate lawmaking authority are, on Rawls's view, those that would
be chosen from a position of highly limited information by free and
rational persons concerned only to advance their own interests. The
Rawlsian veil of ignorance deprives people of any information that
would enable them to assign probabilities to the various ways in which
their lives might turn out on the ground that such information has
nothing to do with what is just or fair. While the rationale for depriving
people of such information is moral in character, the effect of the veil of
ignorance is practical: it forces people to move from an interest-
maximizing strategy to a more conservative maximin strategy that looks
to avoid the very worst outcomes. 104
In evaluating whether EP and RAP would be chosen from the original
position, it is crucial to emphasize the role that minimal access plays in
making possible the development and pursuit of a plausible legal
position. People who lack access to what is minimally needed-and
hence necessary-for pursuing plausible legal positions cannot even
begin to protect their interests in the case of legal disputes: people cannot
competently prosecute or defend lawsuits if they do not have access to
what is necessary to do so. Indeed, it is true, as a logical matter, that it is
103. Here it is helpful to note that this unfortunate state of affairs is only likely to occur in
extremely poor societies in which most persons struggle to meet their basic needs. In such societies,
the state would not be obligated to shift resources from some persons to pay for the access of other
persons because this could not be done without requiring the former to sacrifice satisfaction of
material wants-something that no one can legitimately be coerced to do. In somewhat more
affluent societies where most persons have a small surplus over what is needed to satisfy their basic
needs, RAP would require, at most, shifting resources to assure that every person has access to
sufficient legal resources in cases where vital basic interests are at stake. From the standpoint of
ordinary moral commitments, these results seem quite reasonable.
104. See supra Part II.C.
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not possible for a person to develop or defend an informed legal position
without access to what is necessary to do so.' °5
The value of such ability to rational agents concerned to advance only
their own interests from an original position of limited information is
clear. As far as principles of access are concerned, the worst possible
outcomes for rational self-interested agents worried about the possibility
of legal conflicts with other people involve situations in which they are
denied access, whether for legal or factual reasons, to what is minimally
needed to defend their legal interests. It is true, of course, that how bad
these outcomes are for agents varies indirectly with their material
resources; other things being equal, the more material resources they
have, the better they can tolerate the costs of being denied access to what
they need to defend their interests. But since, from the original position,
the agents do not know what their material prospects are, they must seek
to avoid the worst outcomes. And, from the standpoint of people who
lack information about their own material prospects, the very worst
outcome is utterly unacceptable: to be completely denied access to what
is minimally necessary to defend important legal interests. People in
such situations face substantial threats to their well-being.
Accordingly, rational self-interested agents employing a maximin
strategy from the original position would reject any principle of access
compatible with such outcomes. As will be recalled, the maximin
strategy requires rational self-interested agents to minimize the worst
possible outcome by choosing the principle that allows for the least
objectionable among worst possible outcomes. 1°6 Thus, if there are any
principles with a less objectionable worst outcome than complete lack of
access, a person in the original position would choose from among such
principles. From the standpoint of prudential rationality, any principle
that is compatible with being utterly denied access to what is minimally
needed to defend a legal position is unacceptable.
The maximin strategy dictates the adoption of EP because any
principle that logically implies the negation of EP (i.e., the general
"principle" that it is permissible to deny human beings access to legal
resources for reasons incompatible with their status as moral persons) is
compatible with these unacceptable outcomes. Insofar as the state adopts
a rule that allows it, as a general matter, to deny human beings access to
105. The proposition that it is necessary that P is logically equivalent to it is not possible that not-
P. See, e.g., BRIAN F. CHELLAS, MODAL LOGIC: AN INTRODUCTION (1980).
106. See supra Part II.C.
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legal resources for these reasons, it creates the possibility that agents in
the original position might be utterly denied access to what they need to
defend legal positions. Since the worst outcomes under EP involve, at
most, (misplaced) resentment about someone's access to the justice
system, 107 the maximin strategy requires rejecting any principle that
implies the negation of EP (which, of course, includes the negation of EP
itself).10 8 Accordingly, the maximin strategy requires the adoption of EP
to assure agents that they cannot permissibly be denied access to
something they need to defend their legal interests for reasons that deny
their equality as moral persons.
Nevertheless, adopting EP is not sufficient to fully eliminate
outcomes that are unacceptable from the original position. The reason
for this is that EP, by itself, does not suffice to guarantee access of all
persons to what is minimally needed to defend one's legal interests when
necessary. Insofar as EP prohibits only exclusion for discriminatory
reasons (i.e., reasons that explicitly or implicitly deny any human
being's status as a moral person), it is logically compatible with a state
of affairs in which a person is denied access for non-discriminatory
reasons. As a logical matter, the state would not violate EP by requiring
payment of prohibitively expensive fees for access to legal resources that
do not reflect the costs as long as such a measure is not logically
grounded in a denial of any human being's personhood.
To block all such unacceptable outcomes, people employing a
maximin strategy would have to begin by choosing a rule that guarantees
them access in principle to what is needed to defend their legal
interests-no matter what societal or generational circumstances in
which they find themselves. From the standpoint of prudential
rationality, the prospect of being arbitrarily denied access to what they
need to defend a legal position when significant material interests are at
stake is simply unacceptable. For this reason, rational self-interested
agents employing a maximin strategy from the original position would
choose a rule that, like RAP, defines a positive right that guarantees
access, in principle, to the civil justice system.
But a principle that guarantees only access in principle will not suffice
to block all outcomes in which the agent in the original position is
107. In particular, it would involve resentment that some human being who is mistakenly thought
not to be a person has access to the justice system. It should be clear that this is a less objectionable
outcome from the standpoint of prudential rationality than being denied access for reasons that deny
one's personhood.
108. Every proposition logically implies itself.
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denied access to the legal system, because a person who is guaranteed
access in principle might lack the needed financial resources to take
advantage of such access. From the original position, however, the
selection of a principle that minimizes the risk of these outcomes is
complicated by the fact that principles assuring meaningfully effective
access to the civil justice system will likely require coercive
redistributive measures that implicate other interests that agents in the
original position are concerned to protect. Accordingly, the agent
seeking a principle that provides greater access than one guaranteeing
access in principle will have to give some thought to how the costs will
be distributed.
In deciding among principles of access, then, rational self-interested
agents in the original position must guard against two outcomes that
threaten vital interests. First, since the claim that one has access in
principle does not imply the claim that one has adequate material
resources to effectively access the civil justice system, agents must guard
against the possibility of being unable to afford access to the civil justice
system when they need it to defend vital legal interests. Second, because
citizens will ultimately be coercively taxed to pay for the costs of access,
agents must guard against the possibility of having to sacrifice
significant material wants to subsidize someone else's access to the
justice system.
Unfortunately, there is no principle that would simultaneously
foreclose the possibility of both outcomes. Any principle that forecloses
the possibility of anyone's being denied effective access to the justice
system can do so only by leaving open the possibility that the agent
might be required to forego satisfaction of significant material wants to
subsidize the access of less affluent citizens. Depending on the economic
situation of the society, a guarantee of effective access might require
significant sacrifices on the part of more affluent citizens. Similarly, any
principle that utterly forecloses the possibility of anyone's having to
forego satisfaction of significant material wants to subsidize someone
else's access creates the possibility that the agent might be denied access
to the civil justice system for economic reasons. Depending on the
economic situation of the society, a guarantee of limited taxation for
subsidized access might have the effect that some less affluent citizens
cannot afford to access the civil justice system when they need to.
Accordingly, it is reasonable to think that agents in the original
position would attempt to achieve exactly the sort of balance between
the two outcomes that RAP purports to achieve. To minimize the risk
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that the agents might be required to make material sacrifices to subsidize
someone else's access that are not justified by the benefits, they would
choose a principle that limits the extent to which they can be coercively
required to bear the costs of someone else's access: they will never be
asked to make either significant material sacrifices or sacrifices that are
greater than the benefits they make possible for other persons. To
minimize the risk that the agents might be unable to access the civil
justice system in cases where their vital interests are at stake, they would
choose a principle that requires the state to guarantee effective access in
such cases to the extent that it does not require those subsidizing such
access to sacrifice their own vital interests.
For such reasons, agents in the original position would guard against
such undesirable outcomes by choosing a principle that guarantees, at
most, access to the justice system that is "reasonable" in the sense that
the benefits to those who receive such access outweigh the costs to those
who must subsidize such access and require no citizen to sacrifice vital
interests to subsidize another citizen's access. Agents pursuing a
maximin strategy from the original position must find a prudentially
acceptable way to optimize the worst outcomes to which they might be
subject depending on how their lives go. They must therefore guard
against outcomes that, on the one hand, deny them access to what they
need to defend legal positions and, on the other, require them to sacrifice
significant material desires to reduce the inconveniences of accessing
justice when the public costs of doing so exceed the public benefits. If
we construe the notion of "reasonableness" as being defined in terms of
public benefits outweighing public costs, then RAP will optimize the
worst possible outcome to which an agent in the original position might
be subject. Thus, it is fair to conclude that an agent in the original
position would supplement EP with RAP as a means of excluding all of
the most unacceptable outcomes.
IV. CONCLUSION
This Article attempted to take a significant step towards a general
theory of morally legitimate access. It argued that none of the three most
influential approaches to morally legitimate authority requires the state
to provide citizens with perfectly equal access to the civil justice system;
it is legitimate for the state to allow some inequalities with respect to
how easy or burdensome it is for a citizen to access the civil justice
system. Further, the Article argued that these three approaches to
legitimacy converge on two principles: one that defines an affirmative
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obligation (i.e., the Reasonable Access Principle) to provide to each
citizen what is minimally necessary to develop and defend a plausible
legal position and one that defines a negative obligation (i.e., the
Equality Principle) to refrain from restricting access to the civil justice
system for reasons that deny the equality of every moral person. Taken
together, these two principles define necessary conditions for the
legitimacy of a state's civil justice practice. While there is surely much
to be done in working out a theory of legitimate access, these two
principles represent a significant step towards a fully comprehensive
theory of access.
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